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SUPPLIERS' LIABILITY FOR SALE OF HIGHLY
INFLAMMABLE LIQUIDS TO CHILDREN
The common law principle is well established that it is negligent
to sell a dangerous article or substance to a child who because of his
youth and inexperience is likely to misuse it to his injury.1 This
principle is easily applied to find negligence and liability when the
article supplied to the child is extremely dangerous in nature, requir-
ing a high degree of skill for its safe handling (explosives) ,2 or when
the article is capable of safe handling without undue caution, but is
particularly attractive to children and likely to be misused by them
(firearms).3 These articles are often referred to by courts as being
"inherently dangerous" in nature.4 Thus, it is the common law duty
of the dealer in dangerous articles to refuse such sales to children
when he knows, or should know, that the youth is unfit to be trusted
with them.
A more difficult problem arises, however, where the article or
substance sold is potentially quite dangerous if misused, but is never-
theless commonly utilized in a non-dangerous manner. Typical
examples of such substances are gasoline and lighter fluids. When
faced with a determination of negligence for the sale of such inflam-
mables, the courts have often refused to recognize them as dangerous
to a child or to allow recovery for injury received after the sale of
1. Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 119, 124 (1951). The Restatement of Torts formulates
the rule in the following terms: "One who supplies ... a chattel for the use of
another whom the supplier knows or from facts known to him should know to be
likely because of his youth, inexperience or otherwise, to use it in a manner
involving unreasonable risk of bodily harm to himself and others whom the
supplier should expect to share in, or be in the vicinity of its use, is subject to
liability for bodily harm caused thereby to them." Restatement, Torts § 390
(1934).
2. See, e.g., Burbee v. McFarland, 114 Conn. 56, 157 Atl. 538 (1931) ; Binford
v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426 (1882); McEldon v. Drew, 138 Iowa 390, 116 N.W. 147
(1908); Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567 (1868); Bosserman v. Smith, 205 Mo.
App. 657, 226 S.W. 608 (1920) ; Pierson v. London, 102 Pa. Super. 176, 156 At.
719 (1931).
3. See, e.g., Spires v. Goldberg, 26 Ga. App. 530, 106 S.E. 585 (1921); Hen-
ningsen v. Markowitz, 132 Misc. 547, 230 N.Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1928) ; Poe V.
Canton-Mansfield Dry Goods Co., 36 Ohio App. 395, 173 N.E. 318 (1929); Wassel
v. Ludwig, 92 Pa. Super. 341 (1928); Bernard v. Smith, 36 R.I. 377, 90 At]. 657
(1914).
4. E.g., Burbee v. McFarland, 114 Conn. 56, 157 Atl. 538 (1931) ; Bosserman v.
Smith, 205 Mo. App. 657, 226 S.W. 608 (1920). An "inherently dangerous"
article is one, which if put to the use intended is likely to cause injury.
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such a substance.5 Because of the established principle outlined
above, and the apparent incongruity of the courts' holdings in the
"inflammable" cases with those previously noted, these latter cases
invite analysis. The subject matter to be considered, therefore, is the
common law liability of suppliers of highly inflammable liquids to
children. The decisions are far from harmonious.
In denying liability to the injured child in these cases, the courts
appear to use three basic approaches, often in combination. The
first is to say that the substance is not dangerous enough in small
quantities to require one to foresee that a child will be injured by it,
the theory being that the substance is one in common, non-dangerous
use: The second approach is to admit that inflammables are danger-
ous, but to hold that since the substance is in common use, even
children must know of its dangerous nature.8 The result of either
of these findings is to hold that there was no foreseeability of harm
and that, therefore, the defendant vendor is not negligent as a matter
of law. The third approach is used when the court is willing to admit
negligence on the part of the seller as to the original child purchaser,
but, when the injuries are inflicted by or to others than the original
purchaser, to hold that these actions are intervening forces and to
deny liability because of lack of proximate cause.9
Inflamnmables Not Inherently Dangerous Prevent Liability
The first approach is illustrated by the 1948 New York case of
Traynor v. United Cigar--Whelan Stores Corp.,10 in which the defen-
dant sold the eleven-year-old plaintiff a bottle of cigarette lighter
fluid. The boy subsequently uncorked the bottle, applied a match and
was severely burned. The court held that "as a matter of law, the
cigarette-lighter fluid was not a dangerous substance within the
doctrine that one who puts a dangerous implement in the hands of
a person incompetent to use it is chargeable with knowledge of the
consequences." ' The court stated that the fluid was an article in
5. Mondt v. Ehrenwerth, 251 Ill. App. 226 (1929); Greiving v. LaPlante,
156 Kan. 196, 131 P.2d 898 (1942); Tharp v. Monsees, 327 S.W.2d 889 (Mo.
1959); Traynor v. United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp., 274 App. Div. 800, 79
N.Y.S.2d 329 (1948).
6. With the exception of Mondt v. Ehrenwerth, supra note 5, there seem to
be no judicial decisions involving the sale of inflammables in violation of a
statute.
7. Traynor v. United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp., 274 App. Div. 800, 79
N.Y.S.2d 329 (1948).
8. Tharp v. Monsees, 327 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1959).
9. Greiving v. LaPlante, 156 Kan. 196, 131 P.2d 898 (1942).
10. 274 App. Div. 800, 79 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1948).
11. Id. at 800, 79 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
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common use and was not inherently dangerous. Reasoning that since
the occurrence was not one that a reasonable, prudent man would
foresee, the court found no proximate cause.
This same rationale was applied in Mondt v. Ehrenwerth.12 This
case involved a thirteen-year-old boy who was sent by his parents to
defendant's store to purchase benzine. Previously the boy had run
similar errands without mishap. On the occasion complained of, the
clerk had filled an empty paint can with benzine, the child paid ten
cents and left. The evidence indicated that the boy knew the charac-
ter and qualities of benzine. The court held that under these circum-
stances and in view of the small quantity purchased, the benzine was
not so inherently dangerous as to constitute a violation of a statute.1 3
Children's Knowledge of Dangerous Characteristics Negates Liability
Most courts are willing to recognize that these substances are,
even in small quantities, potentially quite dangerous. Although these
substances are dangerous, it is reasoned, their properties are "well
known to young and old alike"'1 and, therefore, the child can reason-
ably be expected to use inflammables safely. This is the second
method used to prevent recovery from the supplier and was the
basis of the court's decision in the ase of Tharp v. Monsees,"5 decided
by the Missouri Supreme Court in September of 1959. The evidence
showed that defendant service station operator had sold a twelve-
year-old boy three cents worth of gasoline in a jar with a lid on it.
Defendant did not ask the boy why he wanted it, nor did the boy
tell him. After a small amount of the liquid was used to clean paint
brushes, the purchaser and another youngster of eleven decided to
see how the rest would burn. While the latter was pouring the gaso-
line on a small fire, the flame backed up into the jar and in the excite-
ment the contents were spilled on the plaintiff, a boy of four watching
nearby, causing him to be badly burned. Other evidence showed
that the purchaser and his eleven-year-old friend both knew that
the substance would burn and "that people said it was dangerous," 1
but neither knew how dangerous or was aware that the flame would
"backlash" up a poured stream to the container and set the liquid
12. 251 Ill. App. 226 (1929).
13. "That it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, association or corpora-
tion to keep, store, transport, sell or use any crude petroleum, benzine, benzel,
gasoline, naptha, ether or other like volatile combustibles, or other compounds, in
such manner or under such circumstances as will jeopardize life or property."
Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 38 § 326 (1927).
14. Tharp v. Monsees, 327 S.W.2d 889, 897 (Mo. 1959).
15. 327 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1959).
16. Id. at 892.
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in it on fire. The verdict and judgment of $48,000 for plaintiff was
reversed on appeal and the supreme court found "nothing in this
record to support a finding that defendant had any reasonable cause
to anticipate that Jerry Teson [the purchaser] would make any
dangerous or improper use of the small quantity of gasoline sold
.... "I The court noted that it would be "hard to conceive of a normal
twelve-year-old boy (ready to enter high school) and living in a town
or in the country or particularly in the vicinity of a great city with
its many gasoline filling stations and its thousands of gasoline oper-
ated motors, gasoline powered machines, . .. that did not know the
general properties of gasoline and the ease with which it takes fire
or can be ignited."ls The court expressly ruled that section 390 of the
Restatement of Torts's was inapplicable upon the facts of the case,
since a twelve-year-old boy must know the dangerous nature of the
substance.L Therefore, reasonable men could only conclude that the
defendant had acted with due care in making the sale.
Knowledge of the characteristics of benzine by the child purchaser
was a basis of decision in the Mondt case also.21 Proof that the boy
knew the qualities of benzine was one of the reasons why the appel-
late court approved a directed verdict for defendant.
Sale Not Proximate Caitse of Injury to Third Person
Even when the defendant is found negligent, courts sometimes
limit his liability. Under such a circumstance it is said that there is
no proximate cause since the acts of others have intervened and
contributed to the plaintiff's injury.22 In Greiving v. LaPlante,23
an employee of the defendant service station operator sold two cents
worth of gasoline in an open can to a nine-year-old boy. This boy
and the ten-year-old plaintiff were playing in a lot near the plaintiff's
home where they had a fire going in a small can. They had previously
put coal oil on the fire to increase the flame, and when it was
consumed, plaintiff told his friend to go across the street to defen-
dant's service station and buy some gasoline on the premise that
his father wanted it to clean out spots on a hat. The boy purchased
gasoline and gave it to plaintiff who poured it on the fire and was
badly burnt. Verdict for plaintiff was reversed by the Supreme
17. Id. at 898.
18. Id. at 897.
19. Note 1 supra.
20. 327 S.W.2d 889, 897 (Mo. 1959).
21. Mondt v. Ehrenwerth, 251 Ill. App. 226 (1929).
22. The difference between physical causation and limitation of liability must
be recognized. See Prosser, Torts § 47 (2d ed. 1955).
23. 156 Kan. 196, 131 P.2d 898 (1942).
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Court of Kansas which held that the plaintiff's injury was so remote
that it "was not within the probabilities, the natural sequence, which
the appellant is chargeable with foreseeing." 24 Plaintiff's act was an
intervening event and the sale was not held to be the proximate
cause of the particular injury complained of. A dissent by Justice
Harvey pointed out that the defendant's negligence was such that
injury to someone could certainly have been reasonably anticipated,
and that, therefore, the judgment of the lower court should have been
affirmed.2 5 Implicit in this statement is the realization that the
dangerous situation which the supplier has created is not limited to
the child purchaser, but extends also to other children likely to be
playing near him.
This principle was applied in Clark v. Ticehurst,0 decided by the
same court twelve years later. The defendant's employee sold approx-
imately three pints, ten cents worth, of gasoline in an open can, to
an eleven-year-old boy. At the time of the purchase, the boy told
the employee that he was going to use the gasoline to set fire to a
toy airplane. The flame ignited the remainder of the gasoline,
whereupon the boy instinctively threw the can away, burning the
four-year-old plaintiff who was standing nearby. On appeal from
the overruling of defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's petition, the
court limited the rule of the Greiving case to its particular facts, and
held the petition sufficient.
When the seller sold the gasoline to the boy it was with knowl-
edge the boy was going to burn the gasoline and he was bound
to know that in the performance of that burning harm was a
likely and not improbable result, and the mere fact the harm
occurred to another boy instead of to the boy making the pur-
chase cannot avail the appellant.2 7
Thus the court was willing to adopt, in essence, the principle em-
bodied in section 390 of the Restatement of Torts, i. e. that the de-
fendant's responsibility should extend to the purchaser or anyone
whom the defendant should expect to share in or be in the vicinity
of its use. It is felt that this decision is at least moving in the right
direction.
However, the holdings in the 'Traynor, Tharp and Mondt cases are
hard to justify. In ruling that lighter fluid is not inherently dan-
gerous, these cases merely beg the question. Common usage of an
article by no means determines that it is not dangerous; for example
the ordinary automobile is in common use, yet it would doubtlessly
24. Id. at 204, 131 P.2d at 903.
25. Ibid.
26. 176 Kan. 544, 271 P.2d 295 (1954).
27. Id. at 547, 271 P.2d at 297.
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be negligent to put a child behind the wheel of one. Although lighter
fluid and gasoline are commonly used everyday by persons who are
aware of the dangerous uses of the liquids, children are not apt to
realize the risks. Their inquisitive minds, inventive imaginations
and lack of training are factors that make it more reasonable to ex-
pect that children will use these inflammables in dangerous experi-
mentation, rather than in the common manner.
One of the opinions states that twelve-year-old boys must know of
the general properties of gasoline and the ease with which it is
ignited.", No doubt children are aware of the fact that gasoline runs
motors and many machines; but it cannot be said that they know of
the propensity of gasoline, when poured on a fire, to "backlash" or
leap up the stream to the source. But more important, if it must
be granted that young boys know what the courts state that every
boy knows,29 is it not more reasonable to believe that this very knowl-
edge might lead to their setting fires and experimenting, rather than
to safe and cautious conduct? The small amount sold and the de-
livery of the liquid in a closed container, are facts which do not
substantially diminish the risk of serious injury. On the basis of
these considerations, reasonable men might well disagree on the issue
of the defendant's negligence, and as a matter of fact, might readily
find such negligence.
A Suggested Approach
The attractive nuisance doctrine and the doctrine here under dis-
cussion are closely related by their common origins in the early
case of Lynch v. Nurdin.0 In that case, the defendant's servant left
a horse and cart unattended and untied in the street. While the
seven-year-old plaintiff was climbing into the cart, another child
carelessly caused the horse to move and plaintiff was thrown
down and injured. The court held defendant liable although plain-
tiff was a trespasser and had been injured because of his own act
and the act of another child. The court stated that an important
factor in finding a case of negligence sufficient to reach the
jury was whether children might reasonably be attracted to the spot
(or come in proximity to the dangerous instrumentality). "If this
... fact were probable, it would be hard to say that a case of gross
negligence was not fully established." 31 If the jury found that the
plaintiff contributed to the accident, but that in doing so "he merely
indulged the natural instinct of a child in amusing himself with the
28. Tharp v. Monsees, 327 S.W.2d 889, 897 (Mo. 1959).
29. Ibid.
30. [1841] 1 Q.B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041.
31. Id. at 38, 113 Eng. Rep. at 1044.
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empty cart and deserted horse, then we think that the defendant
cannot be permitted to avail himself of that fact.' '3 2 The court con-
cluded by saying that if the act of the servant resulted in tempting
the child then "he ought not to reproach the child with yielding to
that temptation." 3
The court recognized the fact that young children are easily tempted
to meddle. Surely this suggests that, as a matter of policy, peo-
ple should be held responsible for creating or allowing a situation
in which children are likely to meddle, and in their play, seriously
injure themselves. The result of this philosophy, in the attractive
nuisance cases against landowners, has been to hold the landowner
liable where he has done no positive act, but has only allowed a po-
tentially dangerous situation to exist on his land. Certainly, then,
when the supplier does an affirmative act that actually brings the
child and the dangerous substance together, liablity ought to be
readily found.
This proposition finds support in the Canadian case of Yaczhuk v.
Oliver Blcis Co.3 4 In that case, the nine-year-old plaintiff bought
approximately a pint of gasoline at the defendant's service station,
falsely stating, upon inquiry by the attendant, that he wanted the gas
for his mother's car which was stalled down the street. In fact he in-
tended to and did use the gasoline for torches in a game of "Indians."
While he was lighting a bulrush dipped in the pail of gasoline, the
pail caught fire and the young plaintiff, one of several boys present,
was severely burned. On appeal to the Privy Council of the House
of Lords, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada was re-
versed and the defendant was held liable on the ground that "to put
a highly inflammable substance into the hands of a small boy is to
subject him to temptation and the risk of injury, and this is no less
true if the boy has resorted to deceit in order to overcome the sup-
pliers' scruples.."35 The court, citing the "principle stated by Lord
Denman C. J. in Lynch v. Nurdin,"36 also held that the plaintiff
could not be found contributorily negligent and quoted approvingly
from the opinion of the Court of Appeals for Ontario:
If one gives to a child an explosive substance, and the child,
with a limited knowledge in respect to the likely effect of the ex-
plosion, is tempted to meddle with it to his injury, it cannot
32. Ibid.
33. Id. at 39, 113 Eng. Rep. at 1044.
34. [1949] A.C. 386 (P.C.) (Can.). For a discussion of this case see 27 Can.
B. Rev. 845 (1949).
35. [1949] A.C. 386, 394-95 (P.C.) (Can.).
36. Id. at 395.
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be said in answer to a claim on behalf of the child that he did
meddle to his own injury, or that he was tempted to do that
which a child of his years might reasonably be expected to do. 7
It is submitted that this case has reached the proper result. It has
adopted the realistic approach outlined in the Lynch case-that is,
that children are easily tempted to meddle and thus subject them-
selves to injury. Further, this case recognizes that children have a
limited knowledge of inflammable substances, and that although they
may know that these liquids burn, they are not aware that injurious
explosions may occur.
Canclusion
The distinction between cases finding the defendant liable and
those absolving him from responsibility may have a basis not explic-
itly set out in the decisions. Part of the answer may lie in the
differing views the courts have on the propensity of children to
meddle, investigate, experiment and get into mischief, and conse-
quently to use these inflammables in such a way that injury to
someone is likely. If this propensity is slight, there is, perhaps, only
a slight probability of harm resulting from the sale; on the other
hand if it is felt that the propensity is great, the result would be to
say that there is a foreseeable risk and a high probability that harm
will occur. The courts in the Traynor, Tharp and Mondt cases, in
absolving the defendant of negligence, apparently felt that the risk
of harm was slight, or at least justified in the interest of commerce
so as not to "render retail trade and business of vendors extremely
hazardous and to place upon them a burden greater than can be
borne." ,
In the final analysis, the problem is one of balancing society's
interest in encouraging commerce against that in protecting the
safety of children. If there were only a slight risk of injury to
children in selling them inflammable substances, then such sales
would be justified in the eyes of reasonable men. However, it is sub-
mitted that the sounder view is that implicit in the Yachuk, and
Clark cases. In those decisions it is recognized that inflammable
liquids have dangerous properties and even if children are somewhat
cognizant of the danger, they are given to playful experimentation
which often leads to injury. In view of these considerations and the
fact that the sales have little utility to the seller when compared to
the total business volume, it is hoped that the courts will adjust their
views accordingly.
37. Id. at 397.
38. Mondt v. Ehrenwerth, 251 Ill. App. 226, 233 (1929).
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